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Equal Rights for Zombies? 
Phenomenal Consciousness 
and Responsible Agency 
Abstract: Intuitively, moral responsibility requires conscious aware-
ness of what one is doing, and why one is doing it, but what kind of 
awareness is at issue? Neil Levy argues that phenomenal conscious-
ness — the qualitative feel of conscious sensations — is entirely 
unnecessary for moral responsibility. He claims that only access con-
sciousness — the state in which information (e.g. from perception or 
memory) is available to an array of mental systems (e.g. such that an 
agent can deliberate and act upon that information) — is relevant to 
moral responsibility. I argue that numerous ethical, epistemic, and 
neuroscientific considerations entail that the capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility. I focus in particu-
lar on considerations inspired by P.F. Strawson, who puts a range of 
qualitative moral emotions — the reactive attitudes — front and 
centre in the analysis of moral responsibility. 
1. Introduction 
Intuitively, moral responsibility requires conscious awareness of what 
one is doing, and why one is doing it, but what kind of awareness is at 
issue? In Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (2014a), Neil Levy 
argues that phenomenal consciousness — the qualitative feel of con-
scious sensations — is not necessary for moral responsibility. He 
claims that access consciousness — the state in which information 
(e.g. from perception or memory) is available to an array of mental 
systems (e.g. such that an agent can deliberate, report, and act upon 
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that information) — is the only type of consciousness necessary. 
However, Levy’s argument against the necessity of phenomenal con-
sciousness begs the question against the broad class of views inspired 
by Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962), which puts a 
range of qualitative moral emotions — the reactive attitudes — front 
and centre in the analysis of moral responsibility. Roughly, I’ll 
suggest that, on a Strawsonian view, being a morally responsible agent 
requires the capacity to have a range of reactive attitudes, and that, in 
turn, the reactive attitudes are constitutively related to various affect-
laden, phenomenally conscious experiences. Although the reactive 
attitudes are, of course, complex psychological and social phenomena, 
they have a qualitative dimension which makes it the case that 
phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility, or so 
a Strawsonian should argue. 
Part of my interest in focusing on Levy, who is not alone in arguing 
for the normative insignificance of phenomenal consciousness (cf. 
Lee, 2014; forthcoming), is methodological and metaphilosophical. 
Levy (2017, pp. 4–5; cf. 2014a, pp. ix, 31, 122–4, 135) promises to 
deliver a relatively intuition-independent method for assessing our 
moral responsibility in particular ‘hard cases’, such as those cases 
made salient by research on implicit bias (2017; 2014a, pp. 97–103), 
situationism (2014a, pp. 131–4), and sleepwalking (2014a, pp. 71–9). 
He aims to produce an independently plausible and empirically 
informed account of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility 
and then, in ‘mechanical’ fashion (2017, p. 4), to simply see whether 
these conditions are satisfied in the hard cases or not. While I recog-
nize the appeal of bypassing untrustworthy intuitions when we 
deliberate about hard cases, I’ll argue that Levy is not, as it turns out, 
in the casuistical clear. He is wading through the same reflective-
equilibrial morass as the rest of us, because the generation of his 
ostensibly independently plausible theory in fact depends on a range 
of contested (indeed, notoriously controversial) intuitions. So the 
appearance of a common vantage point from which to adjudicate hard 
cases is illusory. Indeed, although I will not argue the point here, I 
suspect that many of the controversial intuitions implicated in this 
debate are also partly behind the intractability in debates about 
responsibility in various hard cases (Madva, 2018). Thus, while my 
narrower aim in what follows is to articulate some Strawson-inspired 
intuitions and arguments that speak against Levy’s premises, my 
broader aim is to showcase the difficulty of avoiding circularity or 
‘bottoming out’ in appeals to intuition in debates about the normative 
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significance of consciousness. Levy’s modus ponens is a 
Strawsonian’s modus tollens: the former argues that phenomenal con-
sciousness doesn’t make a difference, so it doesn’t matter; the latter 
will argue that phenomenal consciousness matters, so it makes a 
difference. In these metaphilosophical respects, I am actually of like 
mind with, for example, Geoff Lee, who also argues for the normative 
insignificance of phenomenal consciousness, yet nevertheless shares 
my concern that ‘it could be harder than it looks to find a non-
question-begging starting point’ in these debates (forthcoming, p. 15 
of preprint). 
Levy’s argument appeals to philosophical zombies, who are 
functionally identical to ‘normal’1 human beings but lack phenomenal 
consciousness. The conceivability of such entities is controversial, and 
so, accordingly, is their relevance for philosophical enquiry into topics 
like moral responsibility. Indeed, one might wonder, given such 
divergent starting points, presuppositions, and methods, why 
Strawsonians should care about adjudicating the status of such 
fictional entities at all.2 I have a few responses here. First, even if 
zombies per se are not intrinsically worthwhile objects of meta-
physical or moral reflection, phenomenal consciousness is (see also, 
for example, Siewert, 1998, §9.4). Take, for example, Jeanine Weekes 
Schroer’s (2015) and Meena Krishnamurthy’s (2017) arguments that 
racial oppression has a distinctive, qualitative ‘what it’s like’ 
character. If they are right, then it is hard for white people to under-
stand the oppression of people of colour in part because they have not, 
and perhaps cannot, experience what it’s like to be oppressed by virtue 
of being racialized and socially positioned as black, or to experience 
what it’s like for individuals of visibly Asian or Latin American 
descent to be assumed to be a foreigner, and so on. Perhaps American 
civilians cannot know what it’s like for wartime soldiers to undergo 
PTSD, or what it’s like for Iraqi citizens to hear drones regularly 
buzzing over their heads. Such examples highlight the potentially 
profound social-epistemic and moral importance of qualitative 
                                                          
1  The very idea of ‘normal’ human beings is obscure and arguably ableist, hence the scare 
quotes, but I won’t address these problematic implications here. I briefly discuss neuro-
atypical persons in §5. 
2  Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to motivate Strawsonians to reflect on 
zombies. Strawson himself would likely have denied both the conceivability and possi-
bility of zombies (see e.g. 1991, §3.5). Thanks to Haoying Liu for bringing this passage 
to my attention. 
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conscious experiences. In this light, zombies may represent a useful, 
catch-all conceptual device for bringing into broader relief the 
salience of phenomenal consciousness, and facilitating finer-grained 
investigation into the relevance of various experiences to numerous 
epistemic, moral, and political projects, including questions of the 
sympathy and solidarity we owe to those whose experiences differ 
dramatically from our own, and the general epistemic value of 
diversity (Gasdaglis, Kim and Madva, in preparation). 
Second, as robots become increasingly autonomous, Strawsonians 
will, like everyone else, have decisions to make about what stance to 
take towards them (see §5, especially note #13). Should we praise, 
blame, and hold autonomous robots responsible? Should we treat them 
as mere tools? Should we develop a variant or entirely novel set of 
reactive attitudes for engaging with them? Nation states have, for 
example, begun to grant citizenship rights to robots (even before they 
recognize the full and equal rights of all their human citizens; Hart, 
2018). Although these actions have, so far, clearly been publicity 
stunts, evidence suggests that we are apt to experience intense sympa-
thetic and other reactions even to highly unsophisticated artificial 
entities (e.g. Vedantam, 2017), which underscores the risk of our over-
attributing mental life and responsible agency to beings who are not 
genuine participants in the moral community. The arguments to 
follow, using phenomenally unconscious zombies as conceptual test 
dummies, imply that certain sorts of (borderline behaviourist) methods 
for tackling these vexed questions are flawed. 
2. Levy’s Argument 
Let us assume for the moment that zombies are conceivable. (I will 
return to the controversy about their conceivability in §§3–4, but if it 
turns out that zombies are inconceivable, that result would suit the 
broader aims of this essay relatively well. Also note that Levy’s argu-
ment will only ask us to conceive of zombies who are functionally, 
rather than physically, identical to us; prima facie, the former seems 
easier to conceive than the latter.) Levy argues that: 
[S]ince zombies are functional duplicates of us, there is nothing we can 
do that they can’t. They are able to perform morally significant actions 
just as we are. They are able to do so after due deliberation. They are 
able to exercise control over their actions. Indeed, they seem capable of 
fulfilling almost any proposed sufficient conditions of moral responsi-
bility. Since this seems… to be the case, it also seems as though it 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
19
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  EQUAL  RIGHTS  FOR  ZOMBIES? 121 
cannot be phenomenal consciousness that is required for moral 
responsibility. (2014a, p. 28; see also 2014b) 
Levy concludes that access consciousness is the only type of con-
sciousness necessary for moral responsibility. The part of his argu-
ment of interest to me here seems to be the following: 
(1) Zombies lack phenomenal consciousness. 
(2) Zombies can do everything we can do. 
(3) We can do whatever is sufficient for moral responsibility [e.g. 
we can deliberate over reasons for action, exert self-control over 
our inclinations, etc.]. 
(4) Therefore, zombies can do whatever is sufficient for moral 
responsibility. (2 and 3) 
(5) Therefore, phenomenal consciousness is not necessary for 
moral responsibility. (1 and 4) 
A few points of clarification about this argument are in order. First, 
strictly speaking, Levy is only arguing here that the debate about the 
necessity of consciousness for moral responsibility is a debate 
specifically about access consciousness: ‘what is at issue in debates 
over moral responsibility is whether agents must have a certain kind 
of access to a certain kind of content in order to be morally responsi-
ble’ (2014a, p. 28n5). The rest of Levy’s book is dedicated to defend-
ing the necessity of access consciousness to moral responsibility, 
against those who argue that consciousness is not universally 
necessary for moral responsibility (e.g. Adams, 1985; Smith, 2005). I 
will ignore this complication going forward. Second, premise (3) 
assumes that adults are sometimes morally responsible: that we 
actually have certain properties or capacities that constitute sufficient 
conditions for moral responsibility for at least some of our actions. 
Levy remains neutral about what such sufficient conditions might be. 
Of course, global sceptics about moral responsibility would not accept 
(3). In fact, Levy (2011) himself is such a sceptic, although for 
reasons related to luck rather than consciousness. The fundamental 
question here is what the conditions for moral responsibility consist 
in, rather than whether those conditions are ever actually met. Third, 
following Levy, this reconstruction suggests that the conditions for 
moral responsibility consist entirely in ‘what we can do’. Given this 
locution, is Levy presupposing that the conditions for moral responsi-
bility consist solely in capacities for action? Almost certainly not: he 
argues that access consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility, 
and access consciousness is not an action. Accessing mental contents 
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need not be a voluntary choice. However, if Levy is making this 
assumption, his argument is open to objections straightforwardly 
analogous to those I raise in what follows (e.g. Reader, 2007). I’ll also 
say more about this ‘what we can do’ locution in the next section. 
3. Phenomenal Consciousness and Moral Responsibility 
Levy’s argument seems to be question-begging. All the work is 
imported into premise (2), that zombies can do everything that we can 
do. Numerous, relatively independent lines of reasoning from ethics, 
epistemology, and perhaps even neuroscience suggest that phenom-
enal consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility, and for a 
variety of other moral and epistemic achievements. Since the 
distinctively epistemic significance of phenomenal consciousness has 
already received philosophical attention (e.g. Lee, forthcoming; 2014; 
Pitt, 2004; Smithies, 2012; 2013), I focus in what follows on moral 
considerations inspired by Strawson. I will circle back to epistemic 
and empirical considerations in the concluding section (§5). On a 
Strawsonian approach, moral responsibility essentially involves the 
capacity to feel a range of moral emotions — the reactive attitudes — 
and to be concerned with the emotional experiences and reactions of 
others. The reactive attitudes are (partly) affect-laden experiences. 
They do not consist solely in cold, cognitive moral judgments, but 
constitutively involve experiences with distinctive qualitative 
characters, e.g. ‘what it’s like’ to feel smouldering resentment when 
someone expresses ill will toward you, or to suffer the sting of 
another’s blame, or to feel the glow of another’s praise. 
Why take this Strawsonian tack?3 Strawson’s organizing aim was to 
respond to ‘pessimists’ who believed that the truth of determinism 
(according to which all events — including all human actions — are 
exhaustively caused by prior events) would make moral responsibility 
senseless. Strawson took exception with the pessimists’ framing of the 
debate (a framing which he claimed was also shared by many of their 
opponents), accusing them of trying to ‘step outside’ human moral life 
to evaluate, as if in one go, the normative legitimacy of all of its 
associated practices and lived experiences. Instead, Strawson invited 
us to investigate these questions ‘from the inside-out’: what are the 
                                                          
3  Thanks to an anonymous referee for recommending that I motivate the Strawsonian 
approach. 
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particular sorts of contexts and ways in which we find it appropriate to 
hold each other responsible? What are the concrete conditions in 
which we find it appropriate to suspend such practices? With some 
plausible gestures towards answering these questions in view, 
Strawson then concluded that abstract physical and metaphysical con-
cerns about the causal structure of the universe could not undermine 
our practices of responsibility. I am not concerned here with the 
success of Strawsonian approaches as responses to the determinist 
threat (see, for example, Fischer and Ravizza, 2000; Russell, 1992), 
but rather with what Strawson ‘found’ when he approached these 
questions via his alternative method, namely, a variety of reactive 
attitudes. Rather than attempting to ground the normative legitimacy 
of our practices of holding each other responsible in abstract theories 
about the causes of human behaviour, Strawsonians argue that the 
legitimacy of these practices depend on, or even consist in, our every-
day understanding and lived experiences of reactions like praise, grati-
tude, resentment, and blame (this is of course not to say that 
Strawsonians must deny the possibility of rationally revising our 
everyday understandings, lived experiences, and moral practices, but 
that such revisions are necessarily piecemeal and holistic; we revise 
some localized judgments and feelings in light of other localized 
judgments and feelings). 
Thus, if you are a Strawsonian of almost any stripe, then you are 
likely committed to (a) affirming that phenomenal consciousness is 
essential to moral responsibility and therefore (b) denying that 
zombies, despite their putative capacities for deliberation and self-
control, are capable of moral responsibility. Even if zombies have 
perfect cognitive access to their perceptions, memories, and reasons 
for action, ex hypothesi they do not actually feel gratitude, resentment, 
etc. Nor, for that matter, do they even feel pleasure or pain. Zombies 
seem to respond appropriately to others’ expressions of approval and 
disapproval, but they do not actually care about the quality of others’ 
wills. They lack qualitatively good or ill wills for others to care about. 
When a zombie shouts, ‘I’ll never forgive you in a million years!’, she 
is not really feeling rage or resentment. Such utterances are ‘full of 
sound and fury, signifying nothing’ (Shakespeare 5.5, e.g. 2003). It is 
unclear, therefore, that such affectless utterances could constitute 
genuine acts of blame. There is, it seems, much we can do that they 
can’t. Strictly speaking, zombies cannot perform morally significant 
actions at all — or so a Strawsonian would argue. 
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There are several distinctive ways in which lacking phenomenal 
consciousness might render zombies ineligible for moral responsi-
bility. A first pass at taxonomizing these ways might distinguish 
between, on the one hand, zombies qua targets of others’ reactive 
attitudes or moral concern, where the questions include whether it 
would be appropriate or possible to judge or hold zombies 
responsible; and, on the other hand, zombies qua agents who express 
(or who in some purely cognitive and unfeeling sense ‘have’) the 
reactive attitudes towards others, where the questions include whether 
it would be appropriate or possible for zombies to hold us responsible. 
Thinking of zombies qua targets, it strikes me as inappropriate, 
absurd, and bordering on psychologically impossible to wholeheart-
edly praise or blame an entity (that I know with certainty to be) 
incapable of experiencing anything pleasurable or painful in response, 
let alone experiencing richer emotional responses like guilt, pride, or 
resentment. My scepticism here is specifically about appropriate, 
genuine, and ‘wholehearted’ praise or blame. I can, of course, easily 
imagine saying, in a congratulatory tone of voice, ‘good job, zombie! 
I’m so proud of you’, perhaps in the hopes of encouraging similarly 
prosocial behaviour from the zombie in the future. (In fact, I often 
succumb to praise- or blame-like outbursts towards much less sophis-
ticated non-conscious tools and machines; §5.) However, if I know 
with apodictic certainty (and I will say more about the importance of 
certainty in §4) that the target of my expression is in-principle 
incapable of feeling anything in response, then it seems that my 
praise-like action would either not be appropriate qua praise, or it 
would not be wholehearted praise, which is to say that I would not 
seriously understand myself to be engaging in praise, or it would not 
really count as praise at all. So it seems to me. But if it did somehow 
count as a genuine act of praise, or if I could wholeheartedly praise an 
entity that I knew felt nothing in response, it would nevertheless 
remain difficult to see how this praise could be deserved. How could 
an individual be owed praise despite being incapable of feeling what 
it’s like to be praised in any meaningful sense? 
For zombies qua agents, it strikes me as equally absurd to suppose 
that they could have moral standing to, say, express gratitude or 
resentment toward others. They are, after all, incapable of experi-
encing these moral emotions, which makes it difficult to understand 
how they could be properly described as ‘expressing’ them at all, 
before we even raise the question whether it could be appropriate to 
do so. Admittedly, zombies’ assertions that such-and-such behaviour 
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was praiseworthy or blameworthy would be just as reliable at tracking 
praiseworthy and blameworthy behaviour as are our expressions of 
praise and blame. There is, then, a limited sense in which these 
utterances would be appropriate; namely, in that they would be likely 
(precisely as likely as our own utterances) to be responses to norma-
tively significant actions. So much for a purely reliabilist account of 
being an agent with standing to praise or blame morally significant 
actions! If the individuals who are ostensibly expressing gratitude or 
resentment cannot feel gratitude or resentment, and cannot care about 
the quality of others’ wills, and do not even have qualitatively good or 
ill wills for others to care about, then they lack the standing to hold 
others, or themselves, morally responsible. Or so it seems to me. 
Of course, Strawsonian intuitions about zombies’ ineligibility qua 
targets of the reactive attitudes and qua agents who express or harbour 
reactive attitudes are clearly related: it seems particularly repugnant to 
think that zombies could properly ‘dish it’ if they cannot ‘take it’, i.e. 
that they could legitimately occupy the stance of a participant in our 
practices of holding (and being held) responsible if they are in-
principle incapable of being on the experiential receiving end of 
others’ reactive attitudes. In what follows, I will urge that, from a 
Strawsonian perspective, being a genuine participant in the moral 
community constitutively involves both the capacities to be an agent 
and a target of the reactive attitudes, to qualitatively care about the 
quality of good or ill will, and to have a qualitatively good or ill will 
for others to care about. I will introduce two thought experiments 
specifically to support the case that phenomenal consciousness is 
necessary for these Strawsonian dimensions of moral responsibility. 
That Levy is so quick to dismiss phenomenal consciousness is 
striking because he elsewhere writes that, ‘Like most theorists of 
moral responsibility, I am concerned with a notion of responsibility 
that is constitutively linked to the appropriateness of the reactive 
attitudes…’ (Levy, 2017).4 Again, it is difficult to see how, say, 
                                                          
4  He continues: ‘I am skeptical that any conception of moral responsibility that divorces it 
from the reactive attitudes concerns anything that is genuinely similar enough to the 
kind of moral responsibility at issue here to perspicuously be referred to by the same 
label’ (Levy, 2017). Levy would likely have to deny that the reactive attitudes con-
stitutively involve phenomenal consciousness. For an argument to this effect about 
reactive attitudes and the moral responsibility of groups, see Tollefsen (2003, pp. 
231ff.). See §5 (especially note #13) for further discussion. I take the thought experi-
ments introduced in this section to support the constitutive claim. 
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scolding a zombie could be appropriate — or even intelligible as a 
genuine act of blame — given zombies’ in-principle incapacity to 
experience any affective responses, like shame or indignation, as a 
result of being scolded; and it is, for the same reasons, equally diffi-
cult to see how it could be appropriate for a zombie to scold us. Since 
Levy countenances a conceptual link between the reactive attitudes 
and moral responsibility, and since the reactive attitudes plausibly 
involve phenomenal consciousness, how could Levy overlook the 
potential significance of phenomenal consciousness to moral 
responsibility? 
Perhaps Levy is hostile to phenomenal consciousness on anti-dualist 
grounds? He may take a deflationary or eliminativist view of phenom-
enal consciousness because he takes it to fit uneasily within scientific 
theories of the world. But concerns about dualism are a red herring 
here. The question is whether phenomenal consciousness matters for 
moral responsibility, regardless what further investigation reveals 
about the underlying nature of phenomenal consciousness.5 In this 
paper, I intend to make as few assumptions as possible about the 
metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness. For example, perhaps it is 
(empirically or conceptually) necessary that any entity as functionally 
complex, embodied, and environmentally and socially situated as a 
‘normal’ person is capable of phenomenal consciousness, in which 
case: so much the worse for the possibility of zombies, and so much 
the better for the necessity of phenomenal consciousness to moral 
responsibility.6 
                                                          
5  For gestures toward naturalistic reductions of phenomenal consciousness and affective 
valence, see e.g. Carruthers (2017) and references therein. 
6  Lee (2014; forthcoming) argues that the mental states of zombies would be equally 
epistemically and morally significant as our own, on grounds of reductive materialism, 
and the claim that there are no natural ‘joints’ or ‘deep divides’ between human con-
sciousness and the quasi-conscious states of zombies. Engaging fully with Lee’s 
naturalistic arguments would take this essay too far afield, but two points bear 
remarking. First, as I mentioned in the introduction, Lee agrees with me about the 
pervasive circularity in these debates. The thrust of his arguments is typically to 
highlight that defenders of the significance of consciousness will be unable to cite 
independent (mutually agreed upon) reasons for their views and so must treat the 
significance of consciousness as somehow primitive or non-reducible, which Lee 
couples with naturalistic protests that such primitivism is implausible (he ultimately 
claims only to have shifted the burden of proof — Lee, 2014, p. 243). Second, I actually 
share Lee’s scepticism about sharp natural joints ‘around’ human phenomenal con-
sciousness, but thereafter we part ways: he infers that it is materially possible for 
indefinitely many ‘nearby’ cognitive systems to instantiate all the normatively signifi-
cant cognitive functions without being conscious, whereas I come to doubt that systems 
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Another possibility is that Levy is thinking of phenomenal con-
sciousness in unduly narrow terms, as merely perceptual (almost epi-
phenomenal) properties. He writes: 
An agent is phenomenally conscious of something (a taste, a sensation, 
a sound) when their mental state has… a qualitative character: the 
apparently ineffable qualities we feel when we perceive colors, or taste 
wine, or hear the soft pattering of rain… Why does the redness of a ripe 
tomato look like that and not, say, like the blue of a late afternoon sky 
(or, for that matter, like the ringing of a church bell)? (2014a, p. 27) 
It may, then, simply not have occurred to Levy that phenomenal con-
sciousness also includes a host of morally relevant affective experi-
ences (although see Levy, 2014b). 
What if we were to ask, by comparison, why does the sting of blame 
feel like that instead of like the glow of praise? Consider, in this vein, 
two further thought experiments. First: 
 INVERSION: Vera has ‘inverted’ moral qualia. She is function-
ally identical to ‘normal’ people and, qua target of the reactive 
attitudes, she responds in typical ways to praise and blame, but 
she actually feels the glow of praise (i.e. a pleasant, positively 
valenced affective state) when she is blamed, and she feels the 
sting of blame (an unpleasant, negatively valenced state) when 
she is praised. Qua agent, Vera outwardly seems to praise and 
blame others in typical ways, but her acts of blame feel to her 
like acts of praise and her acts of praise feel like blame. 
In so far as this case is conceivable (and I will discuss reasons to 
question its conceivability in what follows), it brings into sharp relief 
the moral relevance of affective phenomenal consciousness. While we 
would feel sympathy toward Vera’s tragic moral-psychological plight, 
and should try to help uncross her emotional wires if possible, we 
                                                                                                                  
could approximate these functions without being, at least to some degree, phenomenally 
conscious. It is increasingly clear that accounts of consciousness and mentality must be 
graded in numerous ways (see also Madva, 2018), and Lee also notes that ‘the presence 
of consciousness presumably depends on the presence of a number of continuously 
variable physical magnitudes, meaning that the location of any sharp boundary for 
consciousness will be highly arbitrary’ (forthcoming, p. 12 of preprint). Good riddance 
to sharp boundaries, but assuming that we ‘normal’ waking human adults are far from 
the multifarious indeterminate frontiers between consciousness and non-consciousness, 
I find Lee’s grounds for confidence about the possibility of zombies (who are putatively 
near to us with respect to cognitive function yet radically remote from us with respect 
to consciousness) obscure. 
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would not view her as morally responsible in the same way or to the 
same extent as a person who feels a more ‘normal’ range of emotional 
responses. My intuition is that her experience of others’ blame as if it 
were praise significantly diminishes her responsibility for acting in 
blameworthy ways. Similarly, how could Vera be just as responsible 
as we are for expressing gratitude despite the fact that doing so 
arouses in her the painful, upsetting, or otherwise distracting experi-
ences of indignation? Minimally, this case suggests that the sheer fact 
that, at a certain level of description, she functions like we do should 
not immediately settle whether she meets any conditions for moral 
responsibility one might reasonably propose. Of course, I have not 
asserted that Vera bears no responsibility whatsoever for how she acts 
(Vera is, after all, not a zombie completely devoid of phenomenal 
consciousness), but only that her radically divergent phenomenal 
experiences affect the nature or extent of her responsibility, and, in 
turn, the range of reactive attitudes it would be appropriate to take 
toward her. Intuitively, it would seem appropriate to resent her less for 
her ethical failures and admire her more for her ethical successes, and, 
more generally, to adopt a sympathetic stance as she perseveres 
through her predicament. In other words, Vera’s case minimally 
suggests that phenomenal consciousness makes a difference to moral 
responsibility. Levy’s second premise, that nothing we can do depends 
on phenomenal consciousness, seems at worst false and at best non-
obvious in Vera’s case. It is not clear that she can wholeheartedly 
engage in practices of praise and blame in the same ways that we can. 
Vera’s case may be difficult to genuinely conceive, however. It 
seems more difficult to wrap our heads around than the standard case 
of inverted colour experience because here valence has been inverted, 
and valence is, intuitively speaking, more closely tied to action 
(ceteris paribus, we pursue what we like and avoid what we dislike) 
than are phenomenal experiences of colour.7 Indeed, how could some-
one with inverted moral qualia even develop into a functioning moral 
agent? A virtue-ethicist or sentimentalist might emphasize that Vera 
cannot cultivate virtue because she is incapable of taking the right sort 
of pleasure in doing the right thing. Even Kant, though often cited for 
downplaying the importance of feeling to moral agency, argued that 
the capacities for various moral feelings were preconditions for being 
                                                          
7  Thanks to Peter Ross for discussion about this point. 
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susceptible to the moral law (Denis and Wilson, 2016; Gasdaglis, 
2019). 
This brings us to a key distinction — which Levy may simply over-
look — between the conditions on being a morally responsible agent 
at all and the conditions on being morally responsible for some 
particular action or omission (see, for example, Wallace, 1994, p. 84). 
Plausibly, both phenomenal and access consciousness are necessary 
for responsible agency in general. Both the capacity to access the 
contents of one’s mind and the capacity to qualitatively experience at 
least some range of feelings and reactive attitudes are likely necessary 
for being capable of moral responsibility.8 On this line, zombies 
would not even be candidates for moral responsibility, and the candi-
dacy of individuals like Vera for full responsibility would be signifi-
cantly compromised. That said, phenomenal and access consciousness 
arguably play different roles in moral responsibility. An important 
project for future research is articulating the various roles that 
different sorts of consciousness play in constituting responsible 
agency. Different moral theories will likely spell this out in different 
ways. 
However, Levy might be on firmer ground were he to argue that 
phenomenal consciousness is not necessary for moral responsibility in 
all particular cases. It seems unlikely that, for every action, there 
exists some particular feeling that one must experience in order to 
merit praise or blame for that action. I suspect it depends on the action 
in question. To see how particular feelings might matter in at least 
some particular cases (and to thereby cast further doubt on Levy’s 
claim that nothing that we can do depends on phenomenal conscious-
ness), consider the following individual who, in comparison to 
zombies, more plausibly satisfies the general background conditions 
of responsible agency: 
 BOUTS OF INZOMBIA: Zed is an otherwise ‘normal’ person who 
suffers from temporary bouts of ‘inzombia’: brief periods where 
everything goes ‘dark inside’, but he continues to act fully like 
                                                          
8  Thus, even theorists who deny that awareness is necessary for moral responsibility in 
particular cases (Adams, 1985; Smith, 2005) might accept a different necessity claim: 
that capacities for phenomenal and access consciousness are preconditions for being the 
sort of individual to whom moral responsibility could ever be appropriately assigned. 
However, I agree with these theorists (against Levy) that access consciousness is not 
necessary for moral responsibility in all particular cases. 
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himself. During such bouts, Zed would vehemently deny that he 
was in a zombie state if you asked him. Afterwards, he retains 
propositional memories of what happened, but the memories are 
entirely ‘numb’ and non-episodic: they lack any perceptual or 
affective character. 
 ZED & FRIENDS: now imagine that you are very close to Zed 
and have an intense, long-awaited, moral-emotional exchange 
with him. Zed’s eyes well with tears and his voice quivers as he 
says, ‘I can’t tell you how much I admire you and how grateful 
I am to count you as a friend’ (or ‘After all these years, I’m 
finally ready to forgive you’, or ‘Words can never express how 
deeply sorry I am’). Later, however, you discover that Zed was 
in a zombie state during the interaction.9 
Once you learn that Zed was ‘blacked out’ in this way, will you think 
the interaction retains the full moral significance it seemed to have? 
Might you feel cheated in any way? Might you perhaps want a ‘do-
over’ of the conversation to make sure that Zed really felt the feelings 
you thought he was expressing? Knowing that Zed did not experience 
the affective states associated with the relevant reactive attitudes 
influences our moral assessment of his behaviour, and our sense of 
which reactive attitudes it would, in turn, be appropriate to take 
towards him. If Zed didn’t feel deeply sorry when he apologized, does 
he still deserve gratitude for apologizing? Is forgiveness still an appro-
priate response? Can we even say that there was an apology if he 
literally felt nothing when he gave it? It strikes me as at least open to 
doubt whether Zed can be properly described as giving an apology if 
everything was dark inside when he made the apologetic-sounding 
remarks. I have, therefore, no confidence that Zed can ‘do everything 
we can do’ while in a zombie state; whatever he’s doing when he says 
‘I’m sorry’, he is not obviously apologizing — or so a Strawsonian 
would argue. More generally, the cases of Zed and Vera undermine 
                                                          
9  Note also that we can trivially modify Zed’s social location in these examples to 
generate correlative intuitions about the importance of phenomenal consciousness to 
being the target or agent of the reactive attitudes, i.e. regarding which reactive attitudes 
it is appropriate to hold towards Zed and which reactive attitudes Zed can appropriately 
hold towards others, or, for that matter, towards himself. To this end, we can even 
imagine ourselves in the positions of Zed or Vera, or in the positions of those close to 
them, such as a friend who learns that Zed, say, finally got up the ‘courage’ to propose 
to his fiancée while in a zombie state, and so on. 
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the intuition that merely functionally equivalent cognitive-behavioural 
processes suffice for moral responsibility. 
Most of the ‘folk’ seem to agree that individuals who systematically 
lacked the capacity for these qualitative experiences could not be 
morally responsible (Shepherd, 2015). When asked to imagine 
humanoid machines that acted just like human beings but lacked all 
conscious sensations (including pain, emotion, etc.), participants 
tended to agree that such individuals were conceivable, but that they 
would lack free will and moral responsibility for acting badly. By 
contrast, they believed that humanoid machines with phenomenal 
consciousness would bear moral responsibility. In fact, there are 
rapidly expanding experimental-philosophical literatures on con-
sciousness, responsibility, and their interconnections, which I cannot 
fully explore here (Goodwin, 2015).10 One clear upshot from this 
research, however, is that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness 
plays a powerful role in the folk’s judgments about how individuals 
ought to be treated. We feel as though individuals entirely lacking 
phenomenal consciousness have no ‘skin in the game’ of morality. 
There is nothing ‘at stake’ for zombies, which prevents them from 
being genuine participants in the moral community. 
4. Sympathy for the Zombie? 
Of course, if actually faced with zombies functionally identical to 
‘normal’ human beings, it would be extremely difficult to withhold 
our ordinary affect-laden reactions toward them. It would, in fact, be 
extremely difficult to believe (and perhaps even to conceive) that they 
were zombies. They would seem to be ordinary participants in the 
moral community, and they would presumably act outraged, dis-
traught, or at least perplexed by the suggestion that they lacked inner 
mental lives. I suspect that we would (or at least should; Antony, 
1996; Tanney, 2004) sooner doubt whichever scientist or authority 
figure told us they lacked phenomenal consciousness than we would 
withhold our sympathy or resentment towards them (this is effectively 
the plot of countless tales of science fiction and fantasy: a non-human 
                                                          
10  See Sytsma and Machery (2012) for studies ostensibly suggesting that participants 
sometimes judge that individuals with sophisticated cognitive capacities but impover-
ished experiential capacities deserve significant moral consideration, but I agree with 
Jack and Robbins (2012, p. 402) that Sytsma and Machery’s cases do not involve the 
total absence of phenomenal consciousness. 
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entity — robot, extraterrestrial alien, animal, plant, or even an eco-
system or planet — displays evidence of feeling, intelligence, and 
reactive attitudes, such that the perceptive, empathic protagonists of 
the story fight to defend the interests and rights of the entity, while the 
villains show the entity a callous disregard).11 In other words, in so far 
as we would feel wholeheartedly compelled to praise or resent a 
zombie, I predict that to just that extent we would also find it difficult 
to wrap our heads around the idea that she was really a zombie. 
Seriously imagining ourselves in an interpersonal relationship with 
such an individual naturally involves imagining that we care about the 
quality of her will and that she cares about ours, and thereby contri-
butes to the difficulty of conceiving that such functionally identical 
individuals could entirely lack phenomenal consciousness. 
But what if we stipulate that we could establish, in some way we all 
agree to be conclusive (cf. Putnam, 1963), that certain individuals 
really were zombies? In that case, I think we would — and should — 
shift from the ‘participant’ stance to the ‘objective’ stance toward 
these individuals. We would — and should — cease to think of them 
as genuine participants in the moral community, whom we might 
wholeheartedly resent, and shift towards seeing them more as ‘objects 
of social policy… to be managed’ (Strawson, 1962). It might remain 
useful to keep praising and blaming them, to keep them in line; the 
traditional consequentialist defence of moral responsibility might still 
apply. We might also let ourselves become emotionally engaged with 
zombies, much as we become emotionally engaged with fictional 
characters (cf. Gendler, 2013, §5.3), but such engagement would be 
exclusively for our sake, not the zombies’, i.e. not owed to them by 
the requirements of morality. 
5. What the Zombie Didn’t Know 
My intuition is that affectless, non-conscious agents, like zombies, 
would not only fail to be morally responsible: they would lack the 
moral status we recognize in far less cognitively sophisticated 
                                                          
11  These sorts of stories are, moreover, not just the stuff of science fiction: human history 
is littered with examples of colonialists, war-mongering demagogues, and medical pro-
fessionals making unjust efforts to deny that various human beings were capable of 
feeling the full range of moral emotions. 
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individuals.12 To repurpose Bentham’s (1789) famous exhortation 
about non-human animals, the question is not merely ‘Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? But [also], Can they suffer?’ The central 
question here is not, as is sometimes debated about other animals, 
whether the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is sufficient for 
moral status, or whether some more exalted cognitive capacities are 
also necessary. The question here revolves around entities that 
ostensibly have higher-order, rational capacities but lack experiential 
capacities (including ‘lower-order’ capacities for pain and pleasure 
and ‘higher-order’ moral-emotional capacities, e.g. to react to praise 
by feeling valued, or, for that matter, to react to praise by feeling 
embarrassed). Are the experiential capacities necessary for the 
rational capacities, or necessary for the rational capacities to bear the 
moral significance often associated with them?13 
The conceivability of zombies might seem to entail the con-
ceivability of possessing rational capacities without possessing experi-
ential capacities, but this inference would be too quick. Since zombies 
are entirely unacquainted with affective experience, there is reason to 
doubt that they can properly be said to understand others’ feelings, or 
their moral significance (and how could a zombie be blameworthy for 
hurting my feelings if it doesn’t understand what feelings are?). Can 
zombies, per Levy’s stipulation, actually exercise self-control over 
their actions? What would be the nature or force of the ‘inclinations’ 
they’d have to resist? (And how could a zombie be praiseworthy for 
                                                          
12  It might be the case that zombies have some modicum of moral status (i.e. patiency, 
standing, considerability, etc.). For example, if zombies are living organisms, and if, as 
some argue, all living organisms deserve some moral consideration, then zombies 
deserve some moral consideration. It might, then, be about as intrinsically wrong to 
behead a zombie as it would be to chop down a tree. We would, I hope, nevertheless 
prohibit zombie ‘abuse’ because, as Kant says about the cruel treatment of animals, 
doing so would cultivate vicious traits. See also Siewert (1998, p. 364n4). 
13  Two other types of entity with ostensible possession of rational but not experiential 
capacities are autonomous robots and group agents. See Sparrow (2007, pp. 71–2) for 
insightful treatment of robots’ potential for moral responsibility. Regarding group 
responsibility, I believe I can remain neutral about several of the core debates here, such 
as whether group responsibility is reducible to the responsibility of its members. For 
example, one could maintain that a group’s responsibility depends in part on the experi-
ential capacities of its members without taking a stand on whether the group’s responsi-
bility reduces entirely to features of its individual members. The weaker dependency 
claim would entail that a group comprised solely of zombies could not bear responsi-
bility in the same way as regular groups, which strikes me as plausible. Alternatively, 
one might argue that groups can legitimately experience at least some moral emotions 
(Schmid, 2014; cf. Sosa, 2009; Tollefsen, 2003). 
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overcoming a temptation if it doesn’t actually feel tempted or under-
stand what it’s like to feel and resist temptations?) Finally, can 
zombies even understand what it means to be a ‘reason’, moral or 
otherwise, if they don’t know what it’s like to take something as a 
reason? These questions — whether zombies can understand the 
moral significance of others’ or their own mental states, or what it 
means to be a reason — represent but a few of the considerations 
revolving around the epistemic significance of phenomenal conscious-
ness. In this vein, Declan Smithies has argued that phenomenal con-
sciousness grounds all epistemic rationality.14 Take introspective 
knowledge, for example: 
I know by introspection whether I am feeling pain or pleasure and 
whether I am visually experiencing red or green… the phenomenal 
character of my experience explains how I know these things. There is a 
phenomenal difference between feeling pain and pleasure and… 
between visually experiencing red and green. Intuitively, it is because 
of these phenomenal differences that I can know by introspection 
whether I feel pain or pleasure and whether I am visually experiencing 
red or green. (Smithies, 2013, p. 734) 
The capacities to access, integrate, and act upon information thus 
seem relevant to, but insufficient for, normative statuses like self-
knowledge and moral responsibility. Computers, for example, far out-
strip human minds in terms of the capacities to access and integrate 
(certain sorts of) information, but we don’t typically think that compu-
ters are simply thereby ‘conscious’ of this information in epistemi-
cally or morally relevant senses (e.g. such that it would be appropriate 
to praise them for accessing data). As far as human minds go, our 
rational capacities to access and integrate content are thoroughly 
dependent on affect. In fact, Levy elsewhere writes at length about 
how neuroscience suggests that ‘affect is indispensable to rationality’ 
(Levy, 2009, p. 76; cf. 2007, pp. 80–1, 112, 116–20, 187–95, 293–
308). Citing Antonio Damasio’s research, he contests the assumption 
that ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ are inherently opposed: 
[R]ather than emotions crowding out reasoning, they might partially 
constitute it… even when we have time to deliberate, we cannot 
dispense with affect. It makes options salient for us, helping thereby to 
solve the problem of combinatorial explosion which faces any pure 
calculating machine. (Levy, 2009, p. 76) 
                                                          
14  See Smithies (2012; 2013) and the references therein. 
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Levy (2015, pp. 66–8) further elaborated this view in this journal, in 
response to Sripada (2015), describing ‘valenced signals’ as having 
the dual functional roles of trimming the ‘search space’ for action 
options and ‘biasing deliberation between options that remain’. Levy 
notes that a given ‘signal may be more or less strong, and either posi-
tive or negative. These valenced signals might be experienced as “gut 
feelings”, hunches, intuitions, or affects. As a consequence, the person 
will feel better disposed toward some options than others’ (Levy, 
2015, p. 66). 
This brings us to neuroscientific and other empirical considerations, 
although I can only scratch the surface of this rich and admittedly 
thorny area.15 For one thing, it is increasingly clear that valence is 
fundamental to an even wider array of cognitive processes than Levy 
suggests, making it plausible that phenomenal consciousness is 
essential to the most basic forms of agency. Godfrey-Smith (2016, pp. 
793–4) takes seriously, for example, that ‘the internal processing of 
valence’, rather than highfalutin higher-order processes, played a 
decisive role in the evolution of cognition and subjectivity. And some 
researchers have argued that ‘micro-valences’ of affective value are 
intrinsic to basic perceptual processing, such that everything we see is 
‘either slightly preferred or anti-preferred’ (Lebrecht et al., 2012, p. 2; 
see also Caplette et al., 2014). These theorists place qualitative (albeit 
perhaps very dimly felt) experience at the very heart of cognition 
(Duncan and Barrett, 2007; see also Madva, 2018; Madva and 
Brownstein, 2018). One might also consider individuals whose meta-
cognitive and executive dispositions (i.e. those higher-order dispo-
sitions related to access consciousness that Levy makes central to 
responsibility) are neuroatypical, but whose affective dispositions are 
relatively neurotypical, and who are clearly morally responsible 
agents (Pickard, 2015; Stout, 2017; Richman, 2018). Or one might 
consider the extreme challenges facing individuals who are congeni-
tally insensitive or indifferent to pain, and extrapolate from there to 
the prospects for a hypothetical agent altogether insensitive to affect 
and valence (e.g. Carruthers, 2017, §4). However, cases like insensi-
tivity (or indifference) to pain illustrate just how thorny these matters 
are, because these individuals lack both phenomenal and access con-
sciousness of pain (or of pain’s unpleasant, negative valence). 
                                                          
15  Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to delve further into empirical 
considerations. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
19
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 136 A.  MADVA 
And while the evidence clearly ties qualitative affective experiences 
to certain computational functions, for Levy to acknowledge that 
valenced signals might be experienced in certain ways is clearly not to 
say that they are necessarily experienced, and I am not trying to 
saddle him with such claims. The question, however, arises: would 
these signals retain their full moral and epistemic significance if they 
were completely divorced from phenomenal consciousness, i.e. if they 
were housed in a cognitive system that was in-principle incapable of 
feeling praised, blamed, pleasured, or pained? Consider the question 
whether zombies can be accurately described as exercising self-
control by overcoming temptations. While I (think I) can imagine that 
zombies have functional analogues to the affective-motivational 
pushes and pulls of reasons, inclinations, intuitions, and states of 
feeling ‘better disposed toward some actions than others’, I cannot 
imagine that these analogues figure in genuine exercises of rational — 
or otherwise normatively significant — capacities in so far as they’re 
not even potentially felt. To cast this point in a more Strawsonian 
idiom, I cannot stably occupy the participant stance toward entities 
whom, per stipulation, completely lack phenomenal consciousness. I 
drift inevitably toward doubting that they are truly unconscious, or 
toward perceiving them as purely hydraulic systems, who no more 
deserve credit for what they do than ketchup deserves credit for 
impelling itself out of the bottle, as gravity ‘struggles’ to overcome 
friction. 
Again, contemporary computer programs (e.g. search engines, news 
feeds) excel precisely at narrowing down the search space to the most 
‘relevant’ options, biasing our deliberation among remaining options, 
revising future suggestions in light of our prior behaviour and feed-
back, etc., but no one seriously thinks that these programs merit full-
throated gratitude or resentment simply by virtue of fulfilling or failing 
to fulfil these specific functions. We praise their designers, we get 
frustrated at their glitches, we occasionally slip into brief emotional 
outbursts at the devices themselves, and we give innumerable ‘thumbs 
up or down’ for the sake of training up all the algorithms of modern 
life, but none of this amounts to treating the hardware or software as 
full-blooded participants in the moral community. Yet as mountains of 
science fiction and fantasy can attest, once we start envisioning that 
these systems actually feel pleased by our positive feedback, crest-
fallen by our censure, or heartbroken by our indifference, the con-
ceptual space for holding them responsible and being held responsible 
by them suddenly seems to reopen. Thus, even if we were to stipulate 
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that Levy and others have accurately identified some or all of the 
functional roles of affective experience, and adequately explained how 
the processes that fulfil these roles are essential to epistemically 
rational cognition and ethically praiseworthy action, then all we would 
thereby grant is that fulfilling these roles is necessary for various 
normative accomplishments. It would not follow that fulfilling these 
roles is sufficient for those accomplishments, and it is frankly difficult 
to envision ways of making the case for sufficiency without begging 
the core question or bottoming out in appeals to brute intuition. While 
Levy argues that phenomenal consciousness cannot matter because it 
does not make a difference, any strategy along these lines will have 
little force against someone who thinks that phenomenal conscious-
ness must make a difference because it obviously matters. 
Of course, the contrary, Strawson-inspired position to which I have 
tried to give voice is not above appeals to intuition, either. Thus, while 
the narrower aim of this paper has been to cast doubt on the possibility 
of morally responsible zombies, the broader aim is to cast doubt on 
the possibility of non-question-begging or intuition-independent ways 
of adjudicating such debates. Acknowledging as much may, however, 
ultimately be in the spirit of Strawson’s overarching approach to 
responsibility, which sought to show the irrelevance or incoherence of 
trying to settle such questions from a presuppositionless Archimedean 
point external to our practices, and urged us instead to wade through 
the mud of taking seriously our ground-level intuitions, emotions, and 
lived experiences as they are before presuming to determine how (and 
whether) they ought to be. 
Acknowledgments 
For extensive guidance on early drafts and for ongoing discussion, I 
am especially indebted to Katie Gasdaglis. For extremely helpful and 
thorough commentary on a presentation at the January 2018 meeting 
of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, 
thanks to Haoying Liu. I also benefited there from questions from 
Louise Antony, Robert C. Hughes, Michelle Moody-Adams, and 
others. I also thank several anonymous referees; Charles Michael 
Brent; the audience at the June 2016 meeting of the European 
Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, especially Thomas 
Szanto and Carme Isern Mas; and the Cal Poly Pomona students and 
faculty who participated in a departmental ‘brown bag’ presentation in 
November 2017, especially David Adams, Cory Aragon, Michael 
Cholbi, Peter Ross, Marmar Tavasol, and Dale Turner. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
19
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 138 A.  MADVA 
References 
Adams, R.M. (1985) Involuntary sins, The Philosophical Review, 94 (1), pp. 3–31. 
Antony, L. (1996) Equal rights for swamp‐persons, Mind & Language, 11 (1), pp. 
70–75. 
Bentham, J. (1789) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Caplette, L., West, G., Gomot, M., Gosselin, F. & Wicker, B. (2014) Affective and 
contextual values modulate spatial frequency use in object recognition, 
Frontiers in Psychology, 5, art 512. 
Carruthers, P. (2017) Valence and value, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 93, pp. 658–680. 
Denis, L. & Wilson, E. (2016) Kant and Hume on morality, in Zalta, E.N. (ed.) 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), [Online], 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/kant-hume-morality/. 
Duncan, S. & Barrett, L.F. (2007) Affect is a form of cognition: A neurobiological 
analysis, Cognition and Emotion, 21 (6), pp. 1184–1211. 
Fischer, J.M. & Ravizza, M. (2000) Responsibility and Control: A Theory of 
Moral Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gasdaglis, K.L. (2019) Moral regret and moral feeling(s), Inquiry, March, pp. 1–
29. 
Gasdaglis, K.L., Kim, B.H. & Madva, A. (in preparation) The Irreplaceable 
Epistemic Value of Diversity. 
Gendler, T.S. (2013) Imagination, in Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), [Online], http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
fall2013/entries/imagination/. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016) Individuality, subjectivity, and minimal cognition, 
Biology & Philosophy, 31 (6), pp. 775–796. 
Goodwin, G.P. (2015) Experimental approaches to moral standing, Philosophy 
Compass, 10 (12), pp. 914–926. 
Hart, R. (2018). Saudi Arabia’s robot citizen is eroding human rights, [Online], 
https://qz.com/1205017/saudi-arabias-robot-citizen-is-eroding-human-rights/ [4 
July 2018]. 
Jack, A.I. & Robbins, P. (2012) The phenomenal stance revisited, Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology, 3 (3), pp. 383–403. 
Krishnamurthy, M. (2017) White moral blindness, presented at the Philosophy 
Speaker Series, Eastern Michigan University, January 2012, [Online], 
https://vimeo.com/201868460. 
Lebrecht, S., Bar, M., Barrett, L.F. & Tarr, M.J. (2012) Micro-valences: Per-
ceiving affective valence in everyday objects, Frontiers in Psychology, 3, art. 
107. 
Lee, G. (2014) Materialism and the epistemic significance of consciousness, in 
Kriegel, U. (ed.) Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, pp. 222–245, 
London: Routledge. 
Lee, G. (forthcoming) Alien subjectivity and the importance of consciousness, in 
Pautz, A. & Stoljar, D. (eds.) Themes from Block, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Levy, N. (2007) Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Levy, N. (2009) Neuroethics: Ethics and the sciences of the mind, Philosophy 
Compass, 4 (1), pp. 69–81. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
19
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  EQUAL  RIGHTS  FOR  ZOMBIES? 139 
Levy, N. (2011) Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral 
Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Levy, N. (2014a) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Levy, N. (2014b) The value of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies,  
21 (1–2), pp. 127–138. 
Levy, N. (2015) Defending the consciousness thesis: A response to Robichaud, 
Sripada and Caruso, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22 (7–8), pp. 61–76. 
Levy, N. (2017) Implicit bias and moral responsibility: Probing the data, Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research, 94 (1), pp. 3–26. 
Madva, A. (2018) Implicit bias, moods, and moral responsibility, Pacific Philo-
sophical Quarterly, 99 (S1), pp. 53–78. 
Madva, A. & Brownstein, M. (2018) Stereotypes, prejudice, and the taxonomy of 
the implicit social mind, Noûs, 52 (3), pp. 611–644. 
Pickard, H. (2015) Psychopathology and the ability to do otherwise, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, 90 (1), pp. 135–163. 
Pitt, D. (2004) The phenomenology of cognition or ‘what is it like to think that 
P?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69 (1), pp. 1–36. 
Putnam, H. (1963) Brains and behavior, in Butler, R.J. (ed.) Analytical Philoso-
phy: Second Series, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Reader, S. (2007) The other side of agency, Philosophy, 82 (04), pp. 579–604. 
Richman, K.A. (2018) Autism and moral responsibility: Executive function, 
reasons responsiveness, and reasons blockage, Neuroethics, 11 (1), pp. 23–33. 
Russell, P. (1992) Strawson’s way of naturalizing responsibility, Ethics, 102 (2), 
pp. 287–302. 
Schmid, H.B. (2014) The feeling of being a group: Corporate emotions and 
collective consciousness, in von Scheve, C. & Salmela, M. (eds.) Collective 
Emotions: Perspectives from Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology, pp. 3–22, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schroer, J.W. (2015) Giving them something they can feel: On the strategy of 
scientizing the phenomenology of race and racism, Knowledge Cultures, 3 (1), 
pp. 91–110. 
Shakespeare, W. (2003) MacBeth, Mowat, B.A. & Werstine, P. (eds.), New York: 
Simon & Schuster. 
Shepherd, J. (2015) Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the 
folk seriously, Philosophical Psychology, 28 (7), pp. 929–946. 
Siewert, C. (1998) The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Smith, A.M. (2005) Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental 
life, Ethics, 115 (2), pp. 236–271. 
Smithies, D. (2012) The mental lives of zombies, Philosophical Perspectives, 26 
(1), pp. 343–372. 
Smithies, D. (2013) The significance of cognitive phenomenology, Philosophy 
Compass, 8 (8), pp. 731–743. 
Sosa, D. (2009) What is it like to be a group?, Social Philosophy and Policy, 26 
(01), pp. 212–226. 
Sparrow, R. (2007) Killer robots, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24 (1), pp. 62–
77. 
Sripada, C. (2015) Acting from the gut: Responsibility without awareness, Journal 
of Consciousness Studies, 22 (7–8), pp. 37–48. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
19
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 140 A.  MADVA 
Stout, N. (2017) Autism, metacognition, and the deep self, Journal of the 
American Philosophical Association, 3 (4), pp. 446–464. 
Strawson, P.F. (1962) Freedom and resentment, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 48, pp. 1–25. 
Strawson, P.F. (1991) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: 
Routledge. 
Sytsma, J. & Machery, E. (2012) The two sources of moral standing, Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology, 3 (3), pp. 303–324. 
Tanney, J. (2004) On the conceptual, psychological, and moral status of zombies, 
swamp-beings, and other ‘behaviourally indistinguishable’ creatures, Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research, 69 (1), pp. 173–186. 
Tollefsen, D.P. (2003) Participant reactive attitudes and collective responsibility, 
Philosophical Explorations, 6 (3), pp. 218–234. 
Vedantam, S. (2017) Can robots teach us what it means to be human?, Hidden 
Brain, 10 July, [Online], https://www.npr.org/2017/07/10/536424647/can-
robots-teach-us-what-it-means-to-be-human. 
Wallace, R.J. (1994) Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Paper received December 2017; revised July 2018. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
19
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
